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CASE COMMENTS
Bankruptcy-Bankrupt Retains
Accrued Vacation Pay
The United States Supreme Court recently held that under
section 70a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, accrued vacation pay of
bankrupt employees is not property which passes to a trustee in
bankruptcy. Apparently the Court viewed the right to earn a living
as an economic interest deserving special protection, perhaps because of its "humanistic" overtones. Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18
(1970).
The respective trustees of the estates of appellants Fredrick
and Harris had obtained turnover orders from the referee ordering
each bankrupt to remit his accrued, but as yet unpaid, vacation
pay to the trustee when it was received. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the orders.
Both appellants had filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions.
Their cases differed in the manner in which their employers handled vacations. Fredrick's employer shut down his plant and employees were given full pay during the shut-down. At the time of
the petition, Fredrick had $121.68 of vacation pay to his credit
Harris's employer used the common voluntary vacation plan.
Harris had accumulated $144.14 vacation pay when he filed his
petition of voluntary bankruptcy. In both cases the employee was
not entitled to this pay until his vacation, unless the employment
was terminated earlier.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.' The
court examined Section 70a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act 2 and stated
that "vacation pay is 'property,' title to which vests in the trustee
only if it is (1) non-exempt, (2) transferable or lienable, and (3)
'so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an unemcumbered fresh start' that it should be so regarded."" The court
held that to transfer vacation pay to the trustee would inhibit the
'Fredrick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th. Cir. 1970).
O11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1964).
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall
in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt
as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this title, except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt,
to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . . . (5)
property, including Rights of Action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could %y any means have transferred or which might have
been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered . ..
3425 F.2d 215, 216-17 (9th. Cir. 1970).
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bankrupt's ability to have this "fresh start." The Ninth Circuit
cited Segal v. Rochelle,4 which held that future wages of a bankrupt are not property which passes to the bankrupt's estate. The
court stated that "[v]acation pay is analogous to future wages." 5
The trustee argued that those wages which were compensation for
work done prior to the bankruptcy petition should be considered
as accrued wages for the purpose of section 70a (5). The court
rejected this, stating there was no similarity between wages earned
which are paid at week's end, and vacation pay which has been
credited to the employee, but which he cannot receive until his
vacation or until he is laid off. Such credits, the court said, were
as unobtainable as one's social security account before retirement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in affirming the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 6 settled a conflict

between the circuit courts on the matter.? A contrary result could
easily be reached, for in Segal v. Rochelle2 cited in Lines," the
Court explained:
[T] he main thrust of § 70a (5) is to secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition. To this
end the term "property" has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it
is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.10
In Segal the taxpayer obtained a loss-carrybook tax refund under Internal Revenue Code section 172 (a) ". after bankruptcy had
been filed. The refund was from a period prior to bankruptcy, but
the claim was contingent at the time the petition was filed. When
he paid the initial tax, he had no thought of later receiving a
return on it. The Court reasoned that to deny him the refund
and declare it property to which the trustee was entitled would
not lead to a loss of income which he had expected. The Court decided that the refund was "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy
4382 U.S. 375 (1966).
GFredrick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1970).

e Lines v. Fredrick, 400 US. 18 (1970).
7 See, Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
s 382 U.S. 375 (1966).

9 Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970).
10 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). See also, 35 Fordham L Rev. 342 (1966).
11 "There shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an equal
to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus (2)
the net operating loss carrybacks to such year." INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 172

(a).
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past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make
an unemcumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property' under § 70a (5) ."12
As previously noted, prior to the court's opinion in Lines the
circuit courts had been divided on whether accumulated vacation pay passed to the trustee in bankruptcy with the rest of his
non-exempt property. The Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer s had previously reached the same conclusion as
Lines. The court of appeals in that case reversed a decision which
had held that sums accumulated toward a bankrupt employee's
vacation and retirement were assets of the bankrupt's estate. The
court held that at the time of bankruptcy the employee had no
enforceable rights to these accumulated earnings; he could not
transfer them nor could his creditors attach them. He acquired only
a conditional right to this pay at a later date, contingent upon
the fact that he remain in the employ of the company until time
of payment; therefore, the accumulated vacation pay could not pass
to the trustee.
However, in Kolb v. Berlin,14 the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order requiring the bankrupt to turn over to the trustee in bankruptcy all accrued wages and annual leave pay. The court held
these to be property within section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. In
that case, the bankrupt appellant relied on Tennessee Valley Authorty v. Kinzer'15 to support his argument that the accumulated sums
were not property of the bankrupt's estate. The court distinguished
Tennessee Valley Authority, pointing out that in that case the employee's right to accumulated vacation pay was contingent upon
several factors, while in the case before the Fifth Circuit no contingencies were attached to the employee's right to the accumulated
pay.1
In Lines the Supreme Court skirted the problem of when the
right to vacation pay vests in the bankrupt employee. Instead the
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 US. 375, 380 (1966).
13 142 F.2d 833 (6th. Cir. 1944).
14 356 F.2d 269 (5th. Cir. (1966).
15 142 F.2d 833 (6th. Cir. (1944).
16In support of its decision the court cited In re Kuether, 203 F. Supp.
223 (N.D. Cal. 1962). In that case the district court vacated a ruling of the
referee and awarded a turnover order to the trustee in bankruptcy of all
vacation pay which had accumulated to the bankrupt at the time of the filing
of the voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The Kolb court distinguished the
case from Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944).
stating that the reasons for the opposite result in that case were the contingen12
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Court relied on the definition of the term "property" to reach its
decision on whether vacation pay should be turned over to the
trustee or whether a bankrupt employee should be allowed to retain it. The Court relied on Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 7 in which
it was pointed out that the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act is to allow the bankrupt to turn over all assets he possesses,
and thereby settle all of his debts, giving him a chance to make a
new start unemcumbered by his past debts. The Court said that
whenever possible the provisions of the act should be interpreted
with this purpose in mind. The Court also cited Segal v. Rochelle, 8
as precedent for not relying on the time of the filing of the petition as the sole factor in determining what property was to be turned over to the trustee. In Segal the Court found that the tax refund
claim was "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and
so little entangled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property' under
section 70a (5) ."19

However, in Lines the Court felt the accumulated vacation pay
was to provide for the basic needs of the bankrupt and his family
during the vacation or lay off. It concluded that to a force a bankrupt wage earner to endure such a period without wages would
hardly be in keeping with the purpose of the act-to provide the
bankrupt with a fresh start without the encumbrances of his old
debts.
In reaching this result the court cited Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,20 which held the freezing of wages without notice or
prior hearing was a taking of property prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. 21 The Court in Lines stated that since vacation pay

des attached to the bankrupt's right to the accumulated vacation, which could
have kept the employee from ever receiving the pay.
17292 U.S. 234 (1934).
is 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
'ld., at 380.
20 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See, Comment ProceduralDue Process Application
to Pre-judgement Garnishment, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 165 (1969-70).
21For an expanded definition of "property" see Reich, The New Property, 73 YAtx L.J. 733 (1964):
The institution called property guards the troubled boundary
between individual man and the state. It is not the only guardian;
many other institutions, laws, and practices serve as well. But in a
society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality.
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was a part of the worker's wages, 2 2 it was therefore entitled to the
extra protection which Sniadach23 held was due wages.
This decision should prompt new discussion of the property
rights that receive special federal court protection. One may theorize about wages being a kind of property which might be given
the same type federal court protection that non-property rights,
often called "human rights", have been given in recent years. The
interests which have been most vigorously guarded recently
are free speech, civil and political rights, and privacy, none of
which can be called a property right except perhaps privacy.
Sniadach recognized that wages are of such importance as to be
considered a "human right." Now the Court has this "humanistic
right" into the term "property" in the Bankruptcy Act. The Court
said that accumulated vacation pay is property, and therefore entitled to special protection; to accomplish this end it was necessary
to find that accumulated vacation pay is not "property" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
In Lines the Supreme Court reached what is undoubtedly a
fair result for the bankrupt wage earner. The result seems to follow a trend in which the Court has recognized basic needs of an
individual and has sought to protect these needs. In Bank of Marin
v. England,24 the Supreme Court announced this policy, stating
"that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Another example in which the Court seems to have
ignored clear statutory language [§ 14c(5) of the Bankruptcy
=2See, In re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d 762 (3rd Cir. 1947); In re Wil-low
Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d (2nd Cir. 1940), holding that vacation pay is really
extra wages.
23 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
I4 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). Subsequent to the time of writing some checks,
but prior to their being presented to the bank, a depositor filed a voluntary
bankruptcy petition. The petitioner bank honored the checks of its depositor,
being unaware of the bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee then sought a turnover order for the amount of the checks, and the referee held the bank and
payee jointly liable for this amount. The district court affirmed the referee's
order, and on appeal by the bank the court of appeals affirmed, relying on
§ 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. It held that upon the filing of the bankruptcy
petition the bankrupt's checking account was frozen "by operation of law,'
the bankrupt's property vested with the trustee, and notice of this was unimportant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Section 70d (5)
states that "no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of
bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee." It was argued that the drawing
of the checks after the filing of bankruptcy constituted a "transfer" within the
meaning of § 70d (5). The Court, however, said that there were overriding
"equitable principles" which govern bankruptcy cases and held it would be
inequitable to hold the bank liable for performing its contractual duty to pay
checks of its depositors drawn prior to bankruptcy but presented after the
filing of the petition, where the bank had no notice of the bankruptcy.
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Act2*] in favor of an equitable result was Perry v. Commerce Loan
Co.26

In Lines v. Fredrick2? the Supreme Court expanded the rights
of a bankrupt. In doing this the Court added a new condition by

holding that the meaning of "property" is also limited by the
"basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor a new

opportunity in life and a clean field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."' 28
The Supreme Court has shown an increasing awareness of the
needy and the destitute. The Court has moved to assure that these
persons are not mistreated because of their financial problems. In
Shapiro v. Thompson 29 the Court held statutory provisions which
deny welfare assistance to otherwise eligible recipients solely on the
ground that they have not resided in the state for one year create
an invidious class discrimination. The Court noted that since
such relief is a right and not a privilege,30 the creation of such a
class is a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Again in Goldberg v. Kelly 3' the Court sought to assure that
the impoverished individual's needs are not wrongfully denied him.
The Court noted the dire dependence on this relief by the destitute, and reasoned that in order for a state to terminate this
assistance the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
required a hearing prior to such termination.
25 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (1964).

The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ... . (5) m a proceeding under this Act commenced within six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
. . . . has been granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way of
composition confirmed under this Act ...
26283 U.S. 392 (1966). Plaintiff Perry sought an extension of time to pay
his obligations pursuant to chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. He offered to
pay his debts in equal monthly installments of $60 from his wages of $265 a
month for 28 months in order to pay his debts of $1,412. Within the preceeding
six years Perry had filed a petition in straight bankruptcy and thereby had
obtained a discharge of his debts. Upon motion the referee dismissed plaintiff's
proposal, stating that pursuant to §14c (5) of the Act, the prior bankruptcy was
a bar to this plan. The district court upheld the dismissal and was affirmed
by the court of appeals. 340 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1965). Upon certiorari the
Supreme Court held that § 14c (5) did not affect extension of debt payment
plans, since such plans were developed subsequent to the enactment of the
statute, and reversed the judgment below. See also, Reading Co. v. Brown, 391
U.S. 471 (1968).
27 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
= Id., at 19.
20394 U.S. 618 (1969).
30 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1968).
31.397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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In Lines the Supreme Court has done what many feel is needed; the Court appears to have created a national exemption law
under the Bankruptcy Act. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act 23 says
that the bankrupt shall be entitled to the same ordinary exemption
as he would pursuant to the laws of the state in which he is
domiciled. West Virginia residents get only a two hundred dollar
personal property exemption,'3 while in other states the exemption
may be much higher. The Court has recognized the importance of
wages in our society and has sought to protect them by recognizing
a new property right-the right of an individual to earn a living. In
so doing the Supreme Court has acted where Congress failed to act.
It has created what amounts to a "federal common law" under the
Bankruptcy Act. That a wage earner desperately needs the vacation pay he has accumlated is beyond question. He could not replace this money by another job during a lay-off or vacation period
with anything comparable to what he would receive from this
vacation pay.
The holding in Lines can logically be extended to all of a
bankrupt's accrued but unpaid wages. This is an important extension because many employers "hold back" wages and pay employees for the pay period immediate preceding the one just completed.
Bankrupt employees often have wages owed to them in excess of
the statutory exemption. Thus a bankrupt would be without the
funds necessary to provide for himself and his family if these wages were turned over to he trustee. Extending Lines, the bankrupt would be able to retain these wages in order to get a fresh
start.
The requirement to give the bankrupt a fresh start could be
extended beyond wages, to other necessities, such as a car required for the wage earner's job. However, one would expect the Court
to reach a compromise here. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Lines
v. Fredrick34 may provide some guidelines as to how far the court
will go. He said that by giving the bankrupt this accumulated vacation pay the Court was not giving him a "fresh start", but instead
a "head start" in that he was receiving assets. The Supreme Court
probably would not say one needed a home for a fresh start; a
32 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
33W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8

§ 1 (Michie 1966):
Any husband or parent residing in this State, or the widow, or
the infant children of deceased parents, may set apart and hold personal
property not exceeding two hundred dollars in value to be exempt
from execution.
34400

US. 18 (1970).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 10

1971]

CASE COMMENTS

worker can rent. However, the bankrupt does need a job. The
Court probably will not extend the doctrine very far, but will instead look to Congressional action in the area.
Glenn D. Brumfield
Bankruptcy-New Approach

To Dischargeability
On October 19, 1970, Congress enacted Public Law 91-467,
which radically altered the existing practice concerning bankruptcy
discharges.0 In considering the full impact of this new law, it will
be useful to consider some of the abuses it was meant to correct.
I. Introduction
Underlying the operation of bankruptcy discharge is the
basic concept that in return for surrendering his non-exempt assets
for the benefit of his creditors, the debtor will be discharged from
all his provable debts, except for those debts which might be expressly excepted by statute from the operation of that discharge.'
It can then generally be said that the bankruptcy law does equity
both to the creditor, because he can more easily discover and recover the debtor's assets, 4 and to the debtor, because it is "in the
interest of a sound public policy not to keep the debtor forever
in bondage to his debts, but to restore his energies to the business
community."5
Conceding that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to treat
both the creditor and the debtor fairly, two major sources of abuse have existed in the past which allow the creditor to circumvent
the discharge policy. These were: (1) once a bankruptcy court had
granted a discharge, the actual effect of this on any individual
creditor's claim would be determined in nonbankruptcy courts; and
(2) even if the debtor could have pleaded his discharge in the non' 84

Stat. 990 (U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4536 (1970)).
2 Although enkacted on Oct. 19, 1970 the new law will affect all cases filed

on and after Dec. 19, 1970. 84 Stat. 990 (US. Code Cong & Ad. News 4536, 4540
(1970)).

8In re Anderson 1 F. Cas. 831 (No. 351) (E.D. 1974). See generally
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Collins, 150 W. Va. 655, 149 S.E.2d 221 (1966); RuhlKoblegard Co. v. Gillespie, 61 W. Va. 584, 56 S.E. 898 (1907).
4 7 H. REMtINGTON, A TREATIsE ON THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 2993 (6th. ed. 1955).
6Id. The impracticality of such a bondage can be seen if it is remembered
that many bankruptcies are the product of sincere, but inopportune, business

decisions, rather than fraudulent manipulations.
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